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INSANITY AS A DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES.
rIAT insanity in some of its forms annuls all criminal responsi-
bility, is a well-established doctrine of the common law. The courts
for many years have differed only as to the degree of insanity
necessary to afford a valid defence; no general rule having as yet
been promulgated, though lately there has been less variance in
their decisions.
A consideration of the history tif the law of insanity, in its refer-
ence to criminal responsibility, is a material aid in determining its
present status.
Originally only two kinds of insanity seem to have been recog-
nised by English law-idiocy and lunacy. The law as laid down
by Lord COIKE and Lord HALE, and adopted by the courts until
the beginning of the present century, declared that to absolve a
man from responsibility for his criminal acts, his insanity must be
such as "totally to deprive him of all memory and understanding :"
hale's Pleas of the Crown 30. This doctrine has been called the
.wild-beast" theory, as it inflicted upon an insane person, con-
victed of a capital crime, the same punishment it accorded to wild
beasts, unless it could be shown that he was possessed of more mem-
ory and understanding than they have been allotted by nature.
This doctrine received a blow from Mr. Erskine, in his defence,
on the ground of insanity, of one Hladfield, who was indicted in
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1800 for shooting at King George III., in Drury Lane theatre.
The attorney-general who prosecuted, had appealed to the " wiild-
beast" theory and addressed the jury in accordance with its terus.
Mr. Erskine replied: "Lord COKE and Lord HALE both said ' that
to protect a man from criminal responsibility, there must be a total
deprivation of memory and understanding.' I admit," said lie "that
this is the very expression used, but its interpretation deserves the
utmost attention and careful consideration of this court. If a total
deprivation of memory was intended by these great lawyers to be
taken in the literal sense of the words, the,, no such madness ever
existed; it is idiocy alone which places a man in this helpless con-
dition. But of all the cases that have filled Westminster Hall with
complicated considerations, the insane persons have not only had
the most perfect knowledge and recollection of all the relations in
which they stood towards others, and of the acts and circumstances
of their lives, but have, in general, been remarkable for subtlety
and acuteness; * * * and that delusion of which the criminal act
in question was the immediate unqualified offspring, was the kind
of insanity which should rightly exempt from punishment :" Rad-
field's case, 27 English State Trials 1311. Erskine's eloquence
and logic gained the day, and doubtless obtained the first advance in
favor of the insane. The "wild-beast" theory has never recovered
from this blow.
Twel'e years later, in the casca-df ellingham, tried for the mur-
der of Mr. Spencer Perceval, it was held, for the first time, that
in order to convict the prisoner, he must be competent to know the
difference between right and wrong in the abstract: Belliniyham's
case, 5 C. & P. 168, note b. This, and Hadfield's case, con-
tinued to be the law of England for more than thirty years, although
the decisions of the courts were not always in exact accordance with
the principles there laid down.
In 1843, McNaghten, a Scotchman, shot a Mr. Drummond,
whom he believed to be one of a band of persons following him
everywhere, blasting his character and making his life wretched.
He had transacted business a short time before the deed, and had
shown no obvious symptoms of insanity in his discourse or conduct.
Ile was, however, acquitted on the ground of insanity. This ver-
dict having caused great public alarm and indignation throughout
lic kingdom, the House of Lords propounded certain questions to
the judges, and their answers constitute the present law of Eng-
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land on this subject: _Me.Naghten's case, 10 Cl. & Fin. House
of Lords' Cases 200. The substance may be thus stated: "To
establish a defence on the -ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that at the time of committing the act, the party accused
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature of quality of the act lie was doing; or,
if he did know it, that he was not aware he was doing what was
wrong." Here it will be observed, first, that the questian of right
and wrong in the abstract was renounced, as was the "wild-beast"
theory but a few years earlier ; and, secondly, that now the know-
ledge of right and wrong, as regards the act in question, was held
to be the true test. As to partial insanity, or delusion, as it was
termed, the judges said: "That if a person was acting under an
insane delusion, and was in other respects sane, lie must be con-
sidered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts, with
respect to which the delusion exists, were real. That is to say,
that the acts of the criminal should be judged as if he had really
been in the circumstances lie imagined himself to be in. For ex-
ample, if, under the influence of delusion, lie supposes another man
to be in the act of attempting to take his life, and he kills him, as
he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment.
If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted an injury upon
him in character and fortune, aid he killed him in revenge for
such supposed injury, lie would te liable to punishment."
As was observed, these answers have continued to be the law of
England to the present time; but the former of them has probably
been more frequently adopted than has the latter.
The answers of the judges have also been generally adopted by
the American courts, although there have been many and frequent
variations from the opinions of their English brethren. It may,
however, be said in general, and doubtless it is the common opinion,
that on both sides of the Atlantic the test question, in eases where
insanity is brought forward as a defence in criminal cases, would
be: Did the prisoner, at the time of the commission of the act,
have sufficient strength of mind to know the difference between
right and wrong in regard to that particular act ?
Within the past few years there has been an important quali-
fication annexed to this ruling, in courts whose opinions are deserv-
ing of the highest respect: they have held, that not only must the
prisoner know the difference between right and wrong as regards
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the act in" question, but also must have sufficient mental power to
control the sudden impulses of his own disordered mind. This
addition to the rule, as laid-down by the English judges, has been
of very slow growth, but is now the well-settled law in many of
thie states.
In Pennsylvania, the first decision advancing this doctrine was
in a case tried in Lycoming county, before the late Chief Justice
LEWIS, then president judge of that district. In charging the
jury he said, as to "irresistible impulse :" "It is not generally
admitted, in legal tribunals, as a species of insanity which relieves
from responsibility for crime, and it ought never to be admitted as
a defence until it is shown to exist in such violence as to subjugate
the intellect, control the will and render it impossible for the party
to do otherwise than yield. Where its existence is fully established,
this species of insanity relieves from accountability to human laws."
1Ie afterwards repeated the same views in his work on criminal law:
Lewis's U. S. Crim. Law 404.
In November 1846, Chief Justice Girso-, sitting with Justices
COULTER and BELL at an Oyer and Terminer in Philadelphia, when
charging the jury in the case of Commonwealth v. -Ifosler, reported
in 4 Barr 264, said, inter alia: " I is insanity must be so great as
entirely to destroy his perception of right and wrong; and it is
not until that perceptiontAs thus destroyed, that he ceases to be
responsible. It must amount W delusion or hallucination, con-
trolling his will and making the commission of the act, in his
apprehension, a duty of overruling necessity. The law is, that
whether the insanity be general or partial, the degree of it must
be so great as to have controlled the will of its subject and to
have taken from him the freedom of moral action."
These decisions have been affirmed in the case of Commonwealth
v. Haskell, 2 Brews. 491, in 1869, and lately in Ortwein v. Com-
,ronwealth, 26 P. F. Smith 414. In the former, Judge BREWSTER
said: "The test question is, had the defendant in a criminal case
the power to distinguish right from wrong, and the power to adhere
to the right and to avoid the wrong ?" and in Ortwein v. Common-
eealth, Chief Justice AGNEW repeats the language of Common-
wealth v. liosler, above quoted, and declares the princinle there
laid down to be the law of Pennsylvania.
Among the celebrated decisions in courts of other states, perhaps
the most prominent are State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, and State
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v. Pike, 49 Id. 399; 11 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 233; in which the
opinions of Judge Dou are noted for their learning and research on
this subject. In the latter, lie says, page 441: "If "the alleged
act of the defendant was the act of his mental disewso, it was not,
in law, his act, and lie is no more responsible for it than he would
be if it had been the act of- his involuntary intoxication, or of
:other perspn using the defendant's hand against his utmost resist-
.ance. When disease is the propelling, uncontollable power, the
man is as innocent as the weapon-the mental and moral elements
are as guiltless as the material. If his mental, moral and bodily
strength is subjugated and pressed to an involuntary service, it is
immaterial whether it is done by his disease, or by another, or a
brute, or any physical force or act of nature set in operation with-
out any fault on his part."
The leading cases in the United States holding this doctrine, in
addition to those already mentioned, are State v. Bartlett, 43 N. H.
224 ; Boardman v. }lroodnzan, 47 N. H. 120 ; Comrnonwealth v.
Rogers, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 500 (containing an excellent and ex-
haustive opinion -by Chief Justice SHAw); State v. Johnson, 40
Conn. 137 ; Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 486 ; Roipps v. People, 31
Ill. 385 ; State v. .elter, 25 Iowa 67; Scott Y. (Jonmonwealth, 4
Metc. (Ky.) 227 ; Smith v. Commonwealth, 1 Duval (Ky.) 224;
hf t Allister v. State, 17 Ala. 434; Mberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310,
to which may be added the celebrated Sickles and Hearland
trials, where this point was expressly ruled.
From these decisions it may be safely said, that the proper ques-
tions to be submitted to the jury (in cases where insanity is offered
as a defence), are, first: Was the defendant capable of knowing
that the thing charged against hin was wrong ? and, secondly,
Had he the power to resist the temptation thus to violate the law ?
The question now arises: upon whom rests the burden of proof,
to show this insanity ? Does it devolve upon the state, or upon
the prisoner ? The many varied decisions in the courts of England
and the United States, render it difficult to present any general
rule on this subject. Probably the better established doctrine now
is, that, whenever in the course of the trial, evidence is produced
showing that the prisoner was of unsound mind, the burden of
proof immediately rests upon the prosecution to establish the con-
trary. The onzus is first on the prisoner to show that the insanity
exists, which being done, it immediately shifts upon the Common-
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wealth, and it is for them to show that it does not exist, or if it
does, that it is not such as would prevent him from knowing and
doing the right. For the prosecution must not only prove affirma-
tively that the prisoner committed the deed, but must also show
that he was such a free agent as is necessary in the law to make
his act a crime : Conmonivealth v. li-eath, 11 Gray ( rss.) 303
Commonwealth v. Rogtrs, 7 Met. (Mass.) 500 ; People v. 3lfcCann,
16 N. Y. 58; State v. Pike, 40 N. II. 399, 11 Am. Law Reg. N.
S. 233; State v. Bartlett, 43 N. I. 224; Hllpps v. People, 29
Ill. 386; chase v. People, 40 Id. 352; Polk v. State, 19 Ind.
170; People v. Garbutt, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 554; 17 Mich.
9; .lfeAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434. The following cases also
hold that the jury are to be governed by the preponderance of the
evidence, and do not require that the insanity should be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt: State v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574;
State v. Jones, 50 N. II. 370; Commonwealth v. Eddy, 7 Gray
183; Walter v. People, 32 N. Y. 147; Perris v. People, 35 Id.
125; Loeffner v. State, 10 Ohio 599; Bradley v. State, 31 Ind.
492; Stevens v. State, 31 Id. 485; Fisher v. People, 23 Ill. 283;
State v. Pelter, 32 Iowa 50 ; People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230 ;
State v. ifandley, 46 Mo. 414; MlcKenzie v. State, 26 Ark. 334;
Smith v. Commonwealth, 1 Duval (Ky.) 224 ; Kriel v. Common-
wealth, 5 Bush (Ky.) 362.
The English rule, on the contrary, holds that the prisoner must
prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt; that it is a defence
of confession and avoidance and must be fully proved by the defend-
ant: Regina v. Stokes, 3 C. & K. 188; Regina v. Taylor, 4 Cox
C. C. 155. The English rule is also the law in New Jersey,
Pennsylvania and North Carolina: State v. Speneer, 1 Zabriskie
202; Ortwein v. Commonwealth, 26 P. F. Smith 414; State v.
Brandon, 8 Jones (N. C.) 463.
The question as to the existence of the insanity, and if it does
exist, if to a sufficient degree to relieve the prisoner from punish-
ment, is purely a matter of fact for the jury, and not of law for the
court. Says Judge DoE, in Boardman v. Jfoodman, 47 N. II.
120, "1 The tests and symptoms of insanity are scientific questions,
and are not questions of law, but questions of fact for the jury. It
is no more a matter of law than is the existence of any other
disease. Experts may testify to the indications of mental disease;
as they could not, if such indications were matters of law. That
